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Private sector initiatives certifying that producers of goods and services adhere to defined 
environmental process standards are increasingly popular worldwide. According to proponents, they can 
circumvent chronic barriers to effective public sector environmental regulation in developing countries. 
But eco-certification programs will have limited effects on producers’ environmental performance if, as 
one would expect, they select for those already meeting certification standards. Rigorous evaluations of 
the environmental effects of eco-certification in developing countries that control for selection bias are 
rare. We use plant-level data on more than 80,000 Mexican facilities to determine whether ISO 14001 
series certification of environmental management systems boosts regulatory compliance. We use 
propensity score matching to control for nonrandom selection into the program. We find that plants 
recently fined by environmental regulators were more likely to be certified, all other things equal, but that 
certified plants were subsequently fined just as often as similar uncertified plants. These results suggest 
that in Mexico, the ISO 14001 program attracts dirty plants under pressure from regulators—not just 
relatively clean ones—but does not have a large, lasting impact on their regulatory compliance.  
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1 
Does Eco-Certification Boost Regulatory Compliance in Developing 




Private sector initiatives certifying that producers of goods and services adhere to defined 
environmental process or performance standards are increasingly popular. In the past two 
decades alone, more than 300 initiatives have been launched in a wide range of countries and 
economic sectors (Ecolabel Index 2011). These include Forest Stewardship Council certification 
for managed forests, Rainforest Alliance certification for coffee farms, and International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO) 14001 series certification for manufacturing plants and 
other businesses. In theory, programs like these generate environmental benefits by widening the 
availability and improving the accuracy of information about individual producers’ 
environmental performance, thereby enabling consumers, capital markets, communities, and 
regulators to more easily reward clean producers and sanction dirty ones. For example, armed 
with better information, consumers can buy or boycott products, and lenders can extend or 
withhold credit. 
According to proponents, eco-certification holds special promise as an environmental 
management tool for developing countries (Dingwerth 2008; World Bank 2000). Although acute 
environmental problems are now common in these countries, conventional command-and-control 
regulation generally has failed to adequately address them. The reasons are well known: 
environmental regulatory agencies are undermanned and underfunded, written regulations are 
riddled with gaps, and the political will for strict enforcement is lacking. As a result, regulatory 
noncompliance is widespread (Russell and Vaughan 2003; Eskeland and Jimenez 1992). In 
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theory, eco-certification can sidestep these constraints by creating a private sector system of 
incentives, monitoring, and enforcement.   
Yet credible empirical evaluations of the environmental effects of eco-certification in 
developing countries are rare. One reason is that requisite producer-level data are scarce. A 
second reason is that to be credible, an evaluation—whether of a developing or industrialized 
country program—must control for the nonrandom selection of certain types of producers into 
certification. Relatively clean producers often have strong incentives to obtain certification: the 
costs are relatively low because few additional investments are required to meet the certification 
criteria, and the benefits, such as enhanced sales, can be significant. An evaluation that failed to 
control for such selection would conflate the effect on environmental performance of 
certification with the effect of certified producers’ preexisting characteristics. A recent review of 
the literature evaluating the environmental effects of eco-certification in five economic sectors 
where it is prevalent found only two published studies that controlled for selection bias, neither 
of which focused on a developing country program (Blackman and Rivera In Press).  
The much larger literature on eco-certification and on (closely related) voluntary 
environmental programs (VEPs) in industrialized countries is certainly relevant.
1 But findings 
from this literature may not generalize to developing countries, for at least two reasons. First, the 
socioeconomic context in developing countries is clearly different. Second, the aims both of eco-
certification and VEPs in developing countries are different. In industrialized countries, these 
policies are used to encourage firms to overcomply with mandatory regulations—that is, to 
perform above and beyond legal requirements. In developing countries, by contrast, the hope is 
that they will help remedy noncompliance with mandatory regulation (Blackman 2008, 2010). 
Hence, additional research is needed to determine whether eco-certification can improve 
environmental performance in developing countries. 
To help fill that gap, this paper examines the ISO 14001 series voluntary certification 
program for environmental management systems (EMSs) in Mexico. To our knowledge, it is the 
first econometric analysis of the environmental effects of ISO 14001 certification in a developing 
country and only the second econometric analysis of the environmental effects of a VEP in a 
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developing country. It builds on two recent studies that use some of the same data.
2 These data 
were constructed by merging plant-level registries compiled by the Mexican Ministry of 
Economics, the Mexican Federal Environmental Attorney General’s Office (Procuraduría 
Federal de Protección al Ambiente, PROFEPA, the enforcement branch of the Ministry of the 
Environment), and two private sector companies.  
The focus of our empirical analysis is determining whether ISO 14001 certification 
boosts environmental regulatory compliance. To control for nonrandom selection into 
certification—including nonrandom selection of already clean plants free-riding on unrelated 
environmental management investments—we use a two-stage strategy. In the first stage, we 
estimate a duration model of ISO 14001 certification that includes as independent variables 
lagged PROFEPA fine dummies measuring past regulatory compliance. In the second stage, we 
use propensity score matching to assess the effect of the ISO 14001 certification on subsequent 
regulatory compliance; that is, we compare the average annual incidence of PROFEPA fines for 
certified plants and matched uncertified plants over an outcome period that begins after 
certification. We use the duration model estimated in the first stage to generate propensity scores 
used to match certified and uncertified plants. The combination of a first-stage duration model 
and a second-stage propensity score matching analysis has two attractive features. The duration 
model accounts for the timing of the dependent variable (certification) and the main independent 
variables of interest (lagged fine dummies) and controls for right censoring. The propensity score 
matching model provides a convenient means of testing restrictions on the composition of the 
control group of uncertified plants.  
Our first-stage duration analysis indicates that plants recently fined by PROFEPA were 
more likely to obtain ISO 14001 certification, all other things equal. However, the second-stage 
matching analysis shows that after certification, participants were fined just as often as matched 
nonparticipants. These results suggest that although the program attracted relatively dirty plants, 
not just already clean ones, it did not have a large lasting impact on their regulatory compliance. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background on 
ISO 14001 certification. Section 3 briefly reviews the relevant literature on ISO 14001 
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certification. Section 4 discusses our data. Sections 5 and 6 present our models of certification 
and effects. The last section sums up and discusses policy implications. 
2. Background 
A nongovernmental organization, ISO is the world’s largest developer and publisher of 
international standards. It issued its 14001 series certification for EMSs in 1996 and revised it in 
2004. By December 2007, more than 150,000 facilities in 148 countries had been certified (ISO 
2009). To obtain ISO 14001 certification, which is valid for three years, plants must meet five 
criteria that together comprise a ―plan-do-check-act‖ cycle. They must define an environmental 
management strategy, make a concrete plan to implement it (plan), implement the policy and 
document the results (do), conduct periodic internal performance audits (check), and take 
corrective action to promote continual improvement (act). An independent third-party auditor 
approved by ISO must verify that these criteria have been met. Plants need not meet hard 
performance targets to be certified: in general, certification requirements focus on process rather 
than performance. A supposed requirement for ISO 14001 certification is compliance with all 
applicable local environmental regulations. However, the stringency with which plants are held 
to this (and other) ISO 14001 criteria varies across countries and within them (Nel and Wessels 
2010). The costs of certification can be quite substantial. They include the costs of third-party 
audits, creating a new EMS or modifying an existing one, and continually implementing that 
EMS. In the United States, audit costs range from $239 to $1,372 per employee, and 
implementation costs range from $29 to $88 per employee (Darnall and Edwards 2006).  
In Mexico, ISO 14001 certification grew from zero plants in 1998 to 595 by the end of 
2009 (Contacto 2005). However the majority these 595 plants were state-owned electricity-
generating facilities (owned by Comisión Federal Electricidad) and petroleum refineries and 
distribution terminals (owned by Petróleos Mexicanos). We do not include these plants in our 
analysis because our data on plant characteristics (described in Section 4) are restricted to private 
sector facilities. In addition, the drivers of ISO 14001 certification and regulatory compliance are 
likely different for public and private sector plants. Figure 1 presents data on ISO 14001 
certification by sector and year between 1999 and 2009 for the sample of 298 plants included in 
our empirical analysis.
3 It shows that most certifications in this period were in the manufacturing 
sector and occurred in 2004 and 2005. 
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Figure 1. Within-Sample New ISO 14001 Certifications in Mexico,  
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3. Literature 
This section briefly reviews the literature on ISO 14001 certification in developing and 
industrialized countries. It focuses on findings about (i) the effects of past environmental 
performance on the probability of certification and (ii) the effects of certification on 
environmental performance.  
3.1. Developing-Country Studies 
As noted above, to our knowledge, the present paper is the first econometric analysis of 
the environmental effect of ISO 14001 certification in a developing country. However, three 
other econometric studies have examined the drivers of ISO 14001 certification in developing 
countries: Christmann and Taylor (2001), Montiel and Husted (2009), and Blackman and 
Guerrero (2010). All three find that large plants trading in international markets are more likely Resources for the Future  Blackman 
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to be certified. Only one study, Blackman and Guerrero (2010), examines the effect of past 
environmental performance on the probability of certification. Using a shorter version of the 
panel data used for the present study (that extends through 2005), they find plants that were 
recently fined were more likely to be certified.  
3.2. Industrialized-Country Studies 
3.2.1. Drivers of ISO 14001 Certification 
Several papers examine the drivers of ISO 14001 certification in industrialized countries. 
However, only a handful—all focused on the United States—test for the effect on certification of 
past environmental performance or regulatory pressure. Most, but not all, find a positive 
correlation. For example, Darnall (2003) finds that plants in violation of hazardous waste and 
atomic energy regulations are more likely to be certified; King et al. (2005) find that plants with 
toxic emissions higher than the average for their size and sector are more likely to be certified; 
and Arimura et al. (2008) find that Japanese manufacturing plants subject to environmental 
performance standards and input taxes are more likely to be certified. However, Potoski and 
Prakash (2005a) find an inverted-U relationship between compliance with Clean Air Act 
regulations and certification: plants never in compliance and those always in compliance are 
more likely to be certified than those that are sometimes in compliance.  
As for nonregulatory drivers of certification, virtually all econometric studies of ISO 
14001 adoption find that firm size is positively correlated with certification (Arimura et al. 2008; 
King et al. 2005; Nakamura et al. 2001; Nishitani 2009; Potoski and Prakash 2005a). And 
virtually all studies conclude that sales to foreign buyers also are positively correlated with 
certification (Arimura et al. 2008; Bansal and Hunter 2003; King et al. 2005; Nishitani 2009).  
3.2.2. ISO 14001 Certification Environmental Impacts 
The evidence on whether ISO 14001 certification improves plants’ environmental 
performance is mixed: results depend on the measure of environmental performance and the 
location and type of plants studied. On one hand, Arimua et al. (2008) find that in the Japanese 
manufacturing sector, ISO 14001 certification spurs reductions in natural resource use and waste 
emissions. Using cross-sectional survey data from seven countries that are members of the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Darnall and Kim (in press) reach 
similar conclusions. And Potoski and Prakash (2005a, 2005b) find that ISO 14001 certification 
causes U.S. air polluters to cut their emissions by more than uncertified plants and to spend less 
time out of compliance with Clean Air Act regulations. On the other hand, however, using Resources for the Future  Blackman 
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detailed panel data for a sample of Canadian pulp and paper plants, Barla (2007) finds that ISO 
14001 certification is correlated with increases in some types of water pollution. And using U.S. 
panel data, King et al. (2005) find that although adoption of an EMS spurs reductions in toxic 
emissions, ISO 14001 certification of the EMS does not have an additional impact.  
4. Data 
Official Mexican plant-level census data are not publicly available. We constructed our 
own plant-level data set from four sources. The first is a list of all 595 Mexican facilities that 
obtained ISO 14001 certification through December 2009, along with the plant’s location and the 
year (but not date) of certification. This list was compiled from an annual registry published by 
Contacto magazine.
4 
The second data source is the July 2004 System of Mexican Business Information 
(Sistema de Información Empresarial Mexicano, SIEM). The Mexican Ministry of Economics 
compiles and maintains SIEM and uses it to promote Mexican commerce. The database is 
constantly updated to include new entrants and omit plants that have exited the market. It is not 
time specific; that is, it does not indicate when plants entered SIEM or whether their 
characteristics subsequently changed. SIEM contains basic information on geographic location, 
sector, gross sales, accounting capital, and whether the facility exports, imports, and is a 
government supplier. Our raw SIEM data consist of 528,618 records. However, to limit our 
subsample of uncertified facilities to those types of plants that had a proven history of ISO 14001 
certification, we dropped all plants in sectors (defined by North American Industrial 
Classification codes) that were not also represented in the ISO 14001 database. This step 
eliminated approximately 80 percent of the plants in the SIEM data. 
Our third data source is a 2009 registry of fines levied by PROFEPA, which is 
responsible for monitoring and enforcement of most environmental regulations. This registry 
contains records of every PROFEPA fine between January 1992 (the year PROFEPA was 
created) and December 2009, including the amount and date of the fine. It has data on 44,008 
plants.  
                                                 
4 Unlike lists of Mexican ISO 14001 plants available on Internet sites, Contacto includes plant location data needed 
to merge our four data sets. Resources for the Future  Blackman 
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Our final data source is a 2007 list of 3,850 Mexican maquiladoras obtained from a 
commercial registry (Mexico’s Maquila Online Directory 2007). Designed to take advantage of 
relatively inexpensive Mexican labor, maquiladoras are (mostly foreign-owned) assembly plants 
that import inputs and export outputs without paying tariffs or duties.  
Because the four databases do not have a common numerical code identifying individual 
plants, we merged them by nonnumerical identifiers—plant name, state, and municipio 
(county).
5 These nonnumeric data did not uniquely identify plants. For example, in the SIEM 
data, multiple records have the same plant name, state, and municipio. To avoid incorrectly 
matching records, we dropped all records that were not uniquely identified. This resulted in a 
loss of 5 to 20 percent of the records in each data set. The end result was a sample of 80,611 
plants, of which 298 were ISO 14001 certified and 80,313 were not.  
5. First-Stage Certification Model 
This section describes our first stage model focusing first on the independent variables 
used to explain ISO 14001 certification, then on our empirical strategy, and finally on our results. 
5.1. Independent Variables  
5.1.1. Time-Varying Independent Variables: Fines  
Of the potential drivers of ISO 14001 certification, we are particularly interested in past 
environmental performance and the consequent threat of regulatory sanctions since, as discussed 
above, we need to control for the possibility that already clean plants free-riding on unrelated 
investments in pollution control self-select into certification. As a proxy, we use four 
dichotomous dummy variables indicating how recently the plant has been fined. They are the 
only time-varying independent variables in our certification model. FINE_1YR identifies plants 
fined in the year before the current year, FINE_2YR identifies plants fined two years before, 
FINE_3YR identifies plants fined three years before, and FINE_3YR_PLUS identifies plants 
fined more than three years before. We observe only the year, not the date, of ISO certification. 
Hence, we do not include a fine dummy variable for the current year to avoid conflating cases 
where a fine precedes certification with cases where it follows certification. 
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To motivate these variables, Table 1 present summary statistics on PROFEPA fines 
between 1992 and 2009. In our entire sample of 80,611 plants, 2 percent were fined. Of the 1,468 
plants that were fined, the average number of fines was two per plant, and the average fine was 
135,000 pesos (approximately US$13,500).  
ISO 14001 certified plants were fined far more often uncertified plants: 34 percent of 
certified plants were fined versus only 2 percent for uncertified plants. Hence, there appears to be 
a simple correlation between fines and ISO 14001 certification. However, this correlation does 
not necessarily imply causation, for at least two reasons. First, it may have been generated by 
underlying differences in plant characteristics. For example, it could simply reflect a tendency 
for large plants to be fined and also to obtain ISO 14001 certification. Second, it does not take 
into account the temporal relationship between these events. For example, it lumps together 
cases in which a fine was followed by certification 1 year later and cases in which a fine was 
followed by certification 10 years later, even though the former are more likely to represent 
actual causation. As discussed below, our first-stage model of certification addresses both of 
these issues: it controls for a variety of underlying plant characteristics and takes into account the 
temporal relationship between fines and certification.  
 
Table 1. PROFEPA Fines, 1992–2009 
 
Sample  
        
 
 
All  ISO 14001  
certified 
Uncertified 
All plants     (n=80,611)  (n=298)  (n=80,313) 
  Fined   1.82%  33.56%  1.70% 
Fined plants    (n=1,468)  (n=100)  (n=1,368) 
  Total no. fines  2,881  209  2,672 
  Average no. fines/plant  1.96  2.09  1.95 
  Average size fine (pesos)  134,702.80  90,961.41  137,900.30 
 
5.1.2. Time-Invariant Independent Variables  
Table 2 lists the time-invariant independent variables in the first-stage certification model 
and presents sample means for all plants in the sample, for certified plants, and for uncertified 
plants. Because our main focus is the effect of PROFEPA fines on certification, these variables Resources for the Future  Blackman 
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mainly serve as controls.
6 A few notes about the sector and location fixed effects are in order. 
We include five sector fixed effects dummies drawn from the 17 sector categories in the SIEM 
data set. We omit dummies for the remaining 12 sectors either because all observations in these 
sectors were dropped from the regression sample (see Section 4) or because these dummies were 
perfectly or near perfectly correlated with the dependent variable; that is, they correspond to 
sectors in which either zero or a handful of the plants in our sample were certified.
7 We include 
sixteen location fixed effects dummies that identify the state where each plant is located. 
Dummies for the 16 other states in Mexico were dropped because they were perfectly or nearly 
perfectly correlated with the dependent variable.
8  
 
                                                 
6 See Blackman and Guerrero (2010) for a more in-depth discussion of these variables and their expected influence 
on the probability of certification. 
7 The model includes dummies for Sector 2 (commercial wholesale), Sector 3 (commercial retail), Sector 4 
(construction), Sector 6 (industrial manufacturing), and Sector 15 (real estate services). We dropped dummies for 
Sector 5 (electricity, water, and gas), Sector 11 (waste management, remediation), Sector 12 (entertainment, culture, 
and sports), Sector 13 (health and social assistance), and Sector 14 (educational services) because all observations in 
these sectors were eliminated from the regression sample. We dropped dummies for Sector 1 (agriculture, livestock, 
forestry, fishing, and hunting), Sector 7 (information and mass media), Sector 8 (mining), Sector 9 (other services 
except government), Sector 10 (temporary lodging, food and beverage preparation), Sector 16 (professional, 
scientific, and technical services), and Sector 17 (transport and mail) because they were perfectly or near-perfectly 
correlated with our dependent variable.  
8 The model includes dummies for Aguascalientes, Baja California, Chihuahua, Coahuila, Distrito Federal, 
Guanajuato, Jalisco, Mexico, Nuevo Leon, Puebla, Queretaro, San Luis Potosi, Tamulipas, Tlaxcala, Veracruz, 
Yucatan. We dropped dummies for Baja California Sur, Campeche, Chiapas, Colima, Durango, Guerrero, Hidalgo, 
Michoacan, Morelos, Nayarit, Oaxaca, Quintana Roo, Sinaloa, Sonora, Tabasco, and Verecruz. Resources for the Future  Blackman 
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EXPORT  exporter  8.990  73.154  8.752 
IMPORT  importer  12.915  78.523  12.672 
GSUPPLIER  government supplier  11.552  14.765  11.540 
MAQUILA  maquiladora  0.803  33.893  0.680 
SA_0_3M  gross revenue 0–3 million pesos  85.540  23.826  85.769 
SA_3M_12M  gross revenue 3–12 million pesos  7.366  7.047  7.367 
SA_12M_PLUS  gross revenue 12 million pesos +  7.093  69.128  6.863 
CAP_0_900  accounting capital 0–900K pesos  81.138  26.175  81.342 
CAP_901_5M  acc. capital 900K–5 million pesos  9.620  7.718  9.627 
CAP_5M_PLUS  acc. capital 5 million pesos +  9.242  66.107  9.031 
SECTOR_*  5 sector fixed effects  --  --  -- 
STATE_*  16 state fixed effects  --  --  -- 
5.2. Empirical Strategy: Duration Analysis 
To analyze ISO 14001 certification, we use a duration model, which estimates a hazard 
rate, h, interpreted as the conditional probability that a plant obtains ISO 14001 certification at 
time t, given that it has not already been certified, and given the characteristics of the plant at 
time t, including its history of fines.
9 More formally, 
 
  h(t, Xt, ) = f(t, Xt, )/(1- F(t, Xt, ))  (1) 
where F(t, Xt, ) is a cumulative distribution function that gives the probability that the plant was 
certified prior to time t, f(t, Xt, ) is its density function, Xt is a vector of explanatory variables 
related to the characteristics of the plant (some of which change over time), and  is a vector of 
parameters to be estimated. Following convention, the hazard rate is broken down into two 
components. The first is a baseline hazard, h0(t), that is a function solely of time (not of any 
explanatory variables) and that is assumed to be constant across all plants. It picks up any effects 
not captured by explanatory variables, such as the diffusion of knowledge about ISO 14001 
certification or changes in macroeconomic conditions. The second component of the hazard rate 
                                                 
9 For an introduction to the use of duration models in economics, see Kiefer (1988). Resources for the Future  Blackman 
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is a function of the vector of explanatory variables, Xt. Combining these two components, the 
hazard rate is written 
 
  h(t) = h0(t)exp(Xt').  (2) 
We estimate using maximum likelihood. We use a Cox (1975) proportional hazard 
model because it does not require parametric assumptions about the density function.
10 We use 
years as our temporal unit of analysis. Although we know the day on which plants were fined, 
we know only the year in which plants were ISO 14001 certified. Finally, note that although 
plants can and do obtain ISO 14001 certification more than once, our duration model seeks to 
explain the decision to obtain certification for the first time. As is standard practice with duration 
models, observations (here, plants) are dropped from the regression sample after their first 
―failure‖ (here, certification).  
A duration framework is appropriate for analyzing the effect of fines on ISO 14001 
certification, for two reasons. First, it explicitly accounts for the temporal relationship between 
these phenomena, which (as discussed above) helps determine whether fines actually cause 
certification. Second, it avoids the problem of right censoring that would arise in a cross-
sectional dichotomous choice (probit or logit) model if some plants that were not certified in 
December 2009 (when our panel ends) subsequently joined the program. A duration model 
circumvents this problem by estimating the conditional probability of certification in each 
period.  
                                                 
10 There are two broad approaches to specifying duration models. One is to make parametric assumptions about the 
time dependence of the probability density function, f(t, Xt, ). Common assumptions include exponential, Weibull, 
and log-logistic distributions. Each assumption implies a different shape for the baseline hazard function, h0(t). For 
example, an exponential probability density function generates a flat hazard function, h0(t), which implies that the 
probability of obtaining ISO 14001 certification (apart from the influences of regulatory activity and plant 
characteristics) stays the same over time. A second general approach is to use a Cox (1975) proportional hazard 
model, which does not require a parametric assumption about the density function. This feature accounts for the 
popularity of the Cox model among economists. Resources for the Future  Blackman 
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5.3. Results 
5.3.1. Time-Varying Independent Variable: Fines 
Because the hazard function given by equation (2) is nonlinear, the estimated coefficients 
do not have a simple interpretation (technically, they can be interpreted as the effect on the log 
hazard rate of a unit change in the explanatory variable at time t). Exponentiated coefficients, 
however, can be interpreted as the hazard ratio—that is, the ratio of the hazard rate given an 
increase in an explanatory variable at time t (a unit increase in a continuous variable or a change 
from 0 to 1 of a dichotomous dummy variable) relative to the baseline hazard rate at time t. A 
hazard ratio greater than unity indicates that an increase in the explanatory variable increases the 
hazard rate relative to the baseline. For example, a hazard ratio of 2 means that an increase in the 
explanatory variable doubles the hazard rate relative to the baseline.  
Three of our fine variables—FINE_1YR, FINE_2YR, and FINE_3YR—are significant at 
the 5 percent, 10 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively, and one—FINE_3YR_PLUS—is not 
significant (Table 3, Model A). The hazard rates for FINE_1Y, FINE_2YR, and FINE_3YR 
indicate that a fine assessed one year prior to the current year increases the probability that a 
plant will obtain ISO 14001 certification in the current year by a factor of 1.8, a fine assessed 
two years earlier increases this probability by a factor of 1.5, and fine assessed three years 
earlier, by a factor of 2.3. However, we are not able to reject the hypothesis that these three 
coefficients are equal. Therefore, the appropriate interpretation is that a fine within three years of 
the current year increases the probability of certification by roughly a factor of two. The lack of 
significance of FINE_3YR_PLUS indicates that a fine assessed more than three years prior to the 
current period does not affect the probability of certification.  
 Resources for the Future  Blackman 
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Table 3. Cox Proportional Hazard Models of ISO 14001  








































SA_3M_12M  0.946 
(0.265) 
-- 
SA_12M_PLUS  2.205*** 
(0.497) 
-- 
CAP_901K_5M  1.044 
(0.275) 
-- 
CAP_5M_PLUS  2.689*** 
(0.558) 
-- 
Sector fixed effects  yes  -- 
State fixed effects  yes  yes 
     
Total plants  80,611  2,278 
ISO 14001 plants  298  184 
Log likelihood  -2461.892  -1297.0627 
Model A: full sample. 
Model B: sample restricted to large manufacturing 
plants. 
***Significant at 1% level.  
**Significant at 5% level.  
*Significant at 10% level. 
 Resources for the Future  Blackman 
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A potential concern about our analysis is that fine variables could, in principle, be 
endogenous if they are correlated with unobserved plant characteristics that affect certification.
11 
Although such endogeneity cannot be ruled out, it is unlikely to be driving the observed 
correlation between fines and certification. The reason is that endogeneity would be unlikely to 
generate the temporal response function implied by the results for our fine variables—namely, an 
effect of fines on the probability of certification that diminishes the more distant in time was the 
fine (i.e., after three years). Instead, endogeneity would generate a response that did not change 
over time. Hence, our results suggest a causal relationship between fines and ISO 14001 
certification. 
5.3.2. Time-Invariant Independent Variables  
Estimated hazard ratios for EXPORT, IMPORT, and MAQUILA indicate that plants 
selling their goods in overseas markets were 1.9 times more likely to obtain ISO certification, 
those importing foreign inputs were 2.6 times more likely, and those that were maquiladoras 
were 3.2 times more likely, all other things equal (Table 3, Model A). The hazard ratio for 
GSUPPLIER is not significant. Estimated hazard ratios for the sales and capital dummies suggest 
that larger plants were more likely to join the program. Specifically, plants with more than 12 
million pesos in sales were 2.2 times more likely to be certified, and plants with more than 5 
million in capital were 2.7 times more likely to be certified.
12 For the sector fixed effects (not 
included in Table 3), estimated hazard ratios indicate that, compared with plants in reference 
sectors, those in Sector 6 (industrial manufacturing) were more likely to be certified, and those in 
Sector 3 (commercial retail) and Sector 4 (construction) were less likely.
13 Finally, for the state 
fixed effects (also not included in Table 3), our results indicate that, compared with plants in the 
reference states, those in Colima, Puebla, and Tamaulipas were more likely to be certified, and 
those in the Federal District and Jalisco were less likely.
14   
                                                 
11 For example, aside from our sector dummies, our covariates do not include a precise measure of the complexity 
of the production process, so complexity is partly unobserved. It could be that complex plants are more likely to be 
fined because they have a higher potential for violating environmental regulations and are also more likely to obtain 
ISO 14001 certification because they tend to employ educated and sophisticated managers. If this were actually true, 
then fines would be endogenous. 
12 The reference groups for these dummies are plants with less than 3 million pesos in sales and those with less than 
900,000 pesos in capital.  
13 The reference group comprises plants in the seven sectors (among the 12 represented in our regression sample) in 
which ISO certification was limited (see footnote 7 for a list). 
14 The reference group comprises plants in 16 states in which ISO certification is limited (see footnote 8 for a list). Resources for the Future  Blackman 
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6. Second-Stage Impact Model 
This section describes our second-stage model of the influence of ISO 14001 certification 
on regulatory compliance, focusing first on our empirical strategy, then on our results, and 
finally, on robustness checks. 
6.1. Empirical Strategy: Propensity Score Matching 
As noted above, in evaluating the effect of ISO 14011 certification on regulatory 
compliance, a key challenge is controlling for the nonrandom selection into certification of plants 
with characteristics likely to affect compliance (e.g., size, ties to overseas markets, lagged fines). 
To do that, we use a matching estimator. That is, following Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) and 
more recently List et al. (2003) and Dehejia and Wahba (2002), we construct a matched control 
sample of uncertified plants with observable characteristics that are very similar to those of 
certified plants, and we measure program impact as the difference between compliance rates for 
ISO 14001–certified plants and for this matched control sample. Hence, compliance rates for the 
matched uncertified plants proxy for the unobserved counterfactual: what compliance rates for 
certified plants would have been had they not been certified.
15 More specifically, our impact 
measure—the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT)—is the difference between the 
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15 This approach depends on two identifying assumptions. The first assumption is that conditional only on agents’ 
observed characteristics, the certification decision is ignorable for purposes of measuring outcomes. That is, we are 
able to control for all confounding variables that simultaneously affect the certification decision and the outcome 
variable. This first assumption is untestable. The second assumption, ―common support‖ or ―overlap,‖ is that the 
distribution of observed characteristics for uncertified plants is similar to that for certified plants, such that plants 
with similar characteristics have a positive probability of being certified and of being uncertified. Resources for the Future  Blackman 
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where  
i and i’  are a matched pair of ISO 14001–certified and uncertified plants; 
F(J(i)+1,T)   is the average number of fines levied on facility i each year from year 
J(i)+1 through year T; 
J(i)   is the year during which participant i obtains ISO 14001 certification; 
T  is 2009, the last year of our fines panel; and 
Ni and Ni’  are the number of certified and uncertified plants in the matching analysis 
sample.  
For each matched pair, the first year of the period over which the annual average is 
calculated—the ―outcome period‖—is the first year after the participant obtained ISO 14001 
certification, and the last year is 2009, the last year of our fines panel. The one-year lag ensures 
that all fines in the outcome period occurred after the plant was certified. 
Creating a large set of matched pairs of plants with the exact same observed 
characteristics is challenging when, as in our case, these characteristics are numerous. However, 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) demonstrate that we need to match plants only on the basis of their 
propensity score—that is, their likelihood of participation as predicted by a regression model. 
We use the duration model of program participation presented above to generate propensity 
scores for each certified and uncertified plant in our sample for each year.
16 We match ISO 
14001–certified plants with uncertified plants using propensity scores for the year the former 
obtained certification. For each year of our study period, we prohibit matches between plants 
certified in that year and plants certified in later years.
17  
                                                 
16 Other program evaluations in which the timing of program participation plays an important role have relied on 
duration models to generate propensity scores. See, for example, Brodaty et al. (2001), Sianesi (2004), and Pizer et 
al. (2008). 
17 Take, for example, a plant certified in 2000. In principle, it could be matched to another plant that was not 
certified in 2000 but that was certified in 2001. In essence, such matches amount to pairing treated plants with other 
treated plants. Resources for the Future  Blackman 
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Various methods are available to match participants and nonparticipants based on 
propensity scores (Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008; Morgan and Harding 2006). To ensure 
robustness, we report results from five: nearest neighbor 1-to-1 matching, wherein each certified 
plant is matched to the uncertified plant with the closest propensity score; nearest neighbor 1-to-
4 matching, wherein each certified plant is matched to the four uncertified plants with the closest 
propensity scores and the counterfactual outcome is the average across these four; nearest 
neighbor 1-to-8 matching; nearest neighbor 1-to-16 matching; and kernel matching, wherein a 
weighted average of all nonparticipating plants is used to construct the counterfactual outcome. 
For all five models we enforce a common support and allow matching with replacement.  
We performed balance tests for the five matching estimators. In general, the balance is 
quite good. In the case of two of the five matching estimators (nearest neighbor 1-1 and 1-4), for 
all 33 covariates, the mean for the subsample of certified plants is not significantly different from 
the mean for the subsample of matched uncertified plants. For the other three matching 
estimators, the means for the two subsamples are significantly different only for one or two 
covariates. Table 4 reports median standardized bias (MSB)—Rosenbaum and Rubin’s (1983) 
balance statistic—across all covariates for each matching estimator.
18 The highest MSB is 4.8 
percent for the nearest neighbor 1-8 estimator, and the lowest is 3.2 percent for the kernel 
estimator (Table 4, Model I). Although a clear threshold for acceptable balance does not exist, 
according to Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008), standardized bias below 3 to 5 percent is generally 
viewed as sufficient. These encouraging balance statistics are likely due to the fact that, although 
our regression model includes 33 explanatory variables, our data set includes 269 uncertified 
plants for each certified plant, making it easier to find close matches for each certified plant.  
 
                                                 
18 For a given covariate, the standardized bias is the difference of means in the treatment (here ISO 14001–certified) 
and control (here uncertified) subsamples as a percentage of the square root of the average sample variance in both 
subsamples. We report the median standardized bias (MSB) for all covariates. MSB before matching is 24.365 
percent.  Resources for the Future  Blackman 
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Table 4. Average Treatment Effect on Treated (ATT) Estimates and Median  







Exact matching  
on fines 
Model III 









Nearest neighbor 1-1  0.001 
(0.008) 
 3.469  0.008 
(0.014) 
6.034  0.009 
(0.011) 
3.220 
Nearest neighbor 1-4  0.001 
(0.006) 
3.880  -0.001 
(0.007) 
4.018  0.007 
(0.008) 
4.671 
Nearest neighbor 1-8  -0.001 
(0.005) 
4.778  -0.009 
(0.006) 
4.837  0.001 
(0.007) 
4.834 
Nearest neighbor 1-16  -0.003 
(0.005) 
4.373  -0.007 
(0.005) 
4.380  -0.002 
(0.006) 
2.820 
Kernel  -0.001 
(0.005) 
3.187  -0.006 
(0.004) 
2.695  -0.004 
(0.006) 
2.645 
Model I: treatment and control plants matched on hazard rate for the year of certification. 
Model II: same as I but with exact matching on 0/1 dummy = 1 if plant ever fined. 
Model III: same as I but with sample restricted to large manufacturing plants. 
aAverage annual incidence of fines among treatment group (ISO-certified plants) for full sample 
(Models I and II) = 0.023 fines/year and for restricted sample (Model III) = 0.024 fines/year. 
bStandard errors (in parentheses) computed using bootstrap with 500 repetitions, except kernel 
estimator, which uses 250 repetitions. 
cFor a given covariate, the standardized bias is the difference of means in the ISO 14001–certified 
and uncertified subsamples as a percentage of the square root of the average sample variance in both 
groups. We report the median standardized bias (MSB) for all covariates. Models I–II: MSB before 
matching is 24.365%; Model III: MSB before matching is 17.147%. 
Calculating standard errors for ATT is not straightforward because they should, in 
principle, account for the fact that propensity scores are estimated and for the imputation of the 
common support (Heckman et al. 1998). Therefore, we bootstrap standard errors using 500 
replications for the nearest neighbor estimators and 250 for the kernel estimator (which is 
exceptionally computationally intensive). 
6.2. Results 
Our results are not consistent with the hypothesis that ISO 14001 certification boosts 
regulatory compliance (Table 4, Model I). For all five matching estimators, ATT is not 
significantly different than zero. That is, there is not a statistically significant difference between 
the average annual incidence of fines for certified plants and for matched uncertified plants.  
Although these results suggest that ISO 14001 certification did not have a lasting effect 
on regulatory compliance, a caveat is in order. The limited number of observations and 
variability in our outcome data limit the power of our hypothesis test. As a result, we cannot 
infer that ISO 14001 certification had absolutely no negative effect on the rate at which Resources for the Future  Blackman 
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participants were subsequently fined, only that it did not have a large negative effect. 
Specifically, we can reject the hypothesis that the program reduced this fine rate by more than 42 
percent (ATT ≤ 42% of certified plants’ fine rate).
19  
6.3. Robustness 
This subsection discusses three reasons that our ATT estimates could be biased 
downwards and presents robustness checks that address two of these reasons. The first is 
inadequate matching on key plant characteristics that might drive our outcome variable. For 
example, if the lagged fine variables in the duration analysis are particularly important 
determinants of future PROFEPA fines, and if certified plants that were not previously fined are 
matched to uncertified plants that were, then our ATT estimates could be biased. To address this 
concern, we estimate an ―exact matching‖ model in which plants that were fined at some point 
during our panel are matched to other plants that were fined at some point, and vice versa. The 
results are virtually identical to those presented above (Table 4, Model II). We also estimated 
models with exact matching on dummy variables indicating whether the plant exports, is a 
maquiladora, has more than 30 million pesos in sales, and is in the manufacturing sector. Again, 
the results, are qualitatively identical to those for Model I (see Table A1, at end).  
A second reason that our ATT estimates could be biased downward is if PROFEPA 
monitoring were more stringent for ISO 14001–certified plants than for matched uncertified 
plants. This might happen if (i) PROFEPA targets the types of plants that tend to obtain ISO 
                                                 
19 To see this, first note that the t-score used to test hypotheses about ATT is      C T X X C T X X t
   
 
where  T X and 
C X are the mean outcomes for the treatment and control groups, the numerator therefore is the ATT, and    C T X X    is 
the standard error of ATT. If we know  T X ,    C T X X   , and the t-score needed to reject the null hypothesis that ISO 
14001 certification did not reduce the rate at which participants were subsequently fined (ATT ≥ 0), which we will 
denote t*, then we can calculate 
*
C X , the mean outcome for the control group needed to reject this null hypothesis. 




C t X X
    . The one-sided t-score needed to reject the null at 5 percent given 297 degrees of 
freedom is 1.650. As noted above,  T X  is 0.023.    C T X X  
 
depends on the matching model used. As a result, each 
matching model is associated with a different 
*
C X . The average    C T X X  
 
for all five matching models is
 
0.006. Thus, 
to reject the null hypothesis,  C X would need to be 0.033, which is 42 percent [(0.033-0.023)/0.023)] higher than  T X . 
Since  C X  serves as our counterfactual (i.e., what the mean fine rate for participants would have been had they not 
participated), an equivalent interpretation is that ISO 14001 certification would need to reduce the mean fine rate by 
at least 42 percent. Hence, our results allow us to reject any hypothesis that ISO 14001 certification reduced 
participants’ incidence of fines by more than 42 percent.  Resources for the Future  Blackman 
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14001 certification; and (ii) our matching routines pair a significant number of targeted certified 
plants with nontargeted uncertified plants. The first condition holds: PROFEPA has an explicit, 
written policy of targeting large facilities in particularly dirty sectors, including manufacturing 
and mining (DOF 1990, 1992; Quezada 2005). Our duration analysis shows that these same 
types of plants tend to get ISO 14001 certified. Specifically, we find that plants that were large 
and in the manufacturing sector (Sector 6) were particularly likely to get certified. To test 
whether differential PROFEPA monitoring across plants drives our results, we reestimated our 
duration and impact models with a subsample restricted to the large manufacturing plants that 
PROFEPA targets: plants in Sector 6 with more than 12 million pesos in sales. The 2,278 plants 
meeting these criteria accounted for 184 of the 298 ISO certifications in the full sample of 
80,611 plants. The results of the duration and matching models using this restricted subsample 
are qualitatively identical to those from the full sample (Table 3, Model B, and Table 4, Model 
III). This exercise also provides reassurance that our duration results are robust to 
multicollinearity among our fines, size, and sector regressors resulting from PROFEPA’s 
targeting policy. By construction, this subsample eliminates such multicollinearity.  
To digress briefly, PROFEPA’s targeting policy also explains an apparent inconsistency 
in our arguments. Section 1 states that environmental regulatory pressure in developing countries 
is usually weak, a generalization that holds for Mexico during our study period (Brizzi and 
Ahmed 2001; Gilbreath 2003; OECD 2003). But in Section 5.3 we find that regulatory pressure 
drove ISO 14001 certification in Mexico. The reason both statements are valid is that although 
PROFEPA monitoring and enforcement may have been weak for the average facility in Mexico, 
for the types of plants getting ISO 14001 certified, it was significantly stronger. Our fines data 
reflect this differential monitoring and enforcement. The incidence of fines among all plants 
during our study period was 2 percent, but the incidence among large manufacturing plants 
(more than 12 million pesos in capital) in the manufacturing sector was 23 percent. A 
complementary explanation is that ISO 14001 certification relies on carrots as well as regulatory 
sticks to entice participants, including economic incentives created by buyers. As a result, even 
relatively weak regulatory pressures might trigger a decision to obtain certification. 
Finally, our ATT estimates could be biased downward if regulatory monitoring that leads 
to fines was more stringent for certified plants than for uncertified plants during the outcome 
period, even within the categories of plants that PROFEPA targets. If this were the case, then 
improvements in regulatory compliance due to certification might not be reflected in a lower 
incidence of PROFEPA fines, simply because certified plants were inspected more frequently or 
closely and were therefore fined more than similar uncertified plants. Unfortunately, the hard Resources for the Future  Blackman 
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data on PROFEPA inspections needed to test and control for the stringency of monitoring are not 
available. Prima facie arguments cut both ways. On one hand, it could be that ISO 14001 
certification somehow improves PROFEPA’s ability to monitor a plant’s compliance, perhaps 
because PROFEPA has access to results of third-party audits or internal recordkeeping on ISO 
14001 planning and implementation. On the other hand, however, PROFEPA may have 
rewarded plants that obtained ISO 14001 certification with less stringent monitoring just as 
participants in voluntary programs of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency are sometimes 
rewarded with relaxed oversight (Toffel and Short 2008; Stafford 2007).  
7. Conclusion 
We have used data on some 80,000 industrial facilities and other businesses to analyze 
ISO 14001 certification in Mexico. The first stage of our analysis focused on identifying the 
drivers of certification, and the second stage focused on determining whether it improves 
regulatory compliance. In the first-stage analysis, we used a duration model because it explicitly 
accounts for the timing of the dependent variable (certification) and the main independent 
variable of interest (regulatory activity) and because it controls for right censoring. Our results 
suggest that regulatory fines do motivate certification: a fine roughly doubles the probability of 
certification for three years after it is assessed. Hence, in Mexico, the ISO 14001 program does 
more than certify already clean plants free-riding on unrelated investments in pollution control; it 
has attracted dirty plants under pressure from regulators.  
In the second-stage analysis of program impacts, we used post-certification annual 
average incidence of fines to measure regulatory compliance and we used propensity score 
matching to control for bias created by self-selection into the program of plants with 
characteristics likely to affect compliance. All five of our matching estimators indicate that after 
obtaining ISO 14001 certification, plants were fined no more or less often than matched 
uncertified plants. These results are robust to variations in the criteria for matching, including 
exact matching on plant’s history of fines, and to variations in the composition of our regression 
sample. Hence, our second-stage results suggest that the ISO 14001 certification did not have a 
large lasting effect on the average rate of compliance. It is important to reiterate that variability 
in our outcome data precludes observing modest effects on the average rate of compliance. 
Nevertheless, we believe our results are credible and shed important light on the environmental 
benefits of an increasingly popular but little-studied regulatory policy in developing countries.  
Are our first- and second-stage results contradictory? If ISO 14001 participants included 
dirty plants under pressure from regulators, and if certified plants implemented all the measures Resources for the Future  Blackman 
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required to obtain certification, then why did certified plants on average not have better 
compliance records than uncertified plants? The most likely explanation is simply that the effect 
of ISO 14001 certification on plants’ compliance was limited or temporary or both. This 
explanation is consistent with findings from studies of the environmental consequences of ISO 
14001 certification in industrialized countries (Barla 2007; King et al. 2005) and more broadly 
with findings of studies of VEPs in industrialized countries (Koehler 2008; Khanna 2001; Lyon 
and Maxwell 2008; Pizer et al. 2008). Our findings raise questions about the ability of eco-
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Table A1. Average Treatment Effect on Treated (ATT) Estimates and Median  





Exact matching  
on exports 
Model V 
Exact matching  
on maquiladora 
Model VI 
Exact matching  
on sales 
Model VII 
Exact matching  
on sector 
  ATT  MSB
b  ATT  MSB
b  ATT  MSB
b  ATT  MSB
b 
Nearest neighbor 1-1  0.006 
(0.014) 
 6.927  0.004 
(0.008) 
 5.300  0.000 
(0.013) 
 6.845  0.009 
(0.009) 
 8.343 
Nearest neighbor 1-4  -0.006 
(0.011) 
6.900  -0.005 
(0.006) 
4.814  -0.005 
(0.008) 
6.615  -0.004 
(0.010) 
6.969 
Nearest neighbor 1-8  -0.000 
(0.007) 
6.121  -0.008 
(0.006) 
4.766  0.002 
(0.007) 
4.904  0.001 
(0.007) 
5.471 
Nearest neighbor 1-16  -0.004 
(0.006) 
4.476  -0.006 
(0.005) 
4.361  -0.000 
(0.005) 
4.722  -0.001 
(0.006) 
4.025 
Kernel  -0.003 
(0.004) 
3.881  -0.003 
(0.004) 
2.408  -0.002 
(0.004) 
3.740  -0.003 
(0.004) 
2.799 
Model IV: same as I but with exact matching on 0/1 dummy = 1 if plant exports. 
Model V: same as I but with exact matching on 0/1 dummy = 1 if plant is a maquiladora. 
Model VI: same as I but with exact matching on 0/1 dummy = 1 if plant has over 30 million pesos in sales. 
Model VII: same as I but with exact matching on 0/1 dummy = 1 if plant in manufacturing sector. 
aFor all models, the average annual incidence of fines among treatment group (ISO-certified plants) = 0.023 fines/year.  
cFor a given covariate, the standardized bias is the difference of means in the ISO 14001 certified and uncertified 
subsamples as a percentage of the square root of the average sample variance in both groups. We report the median 
standardized bias (MSB) for all covariates. For all models, MSB before matching is 24.365%. 
***Significant at 1% level.  
 
 